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What is Democratic Education?*
David R. Hiley
Department of Philosophy

W

hy does education matter in a democratic
society and in particular, why does higher
education matter? What should a democratic education be like, and who should decide how
future citizens will be educated?
These questions suggest that education is a political
matter as much as it is about teaching and curriculum.
Plato understood this when he placed education at the
center of his construction of the ideal Republic. Thomas
Jefferson also understood this from the earliest days of
the democratic revolution in America.
In 1779, Jefferson submitted a bill to the Virginia
legislature that, had it passed, would have provided a
system of education from primary school through university at public expense. His “Bill for the More General
Diffusion of Knowledge” included a selection system
through which young men (yes, only young men) of
ability could rise through the system to university
education regardless of family background and means.1
He offered three interconnected rationales. First, ignorance enslaved the mind, and only education could
liberate people from the powers of tyrants and the
superstitions of priests. Second, publicly supported
education would break down the artificial, inherited
aristocracy that was characteristic of Europe and would
replace it with an egalitarian society. Finally, Jefferson
also well knew the inherent risks when the people rule.
The rule of the people can so easily degenerate into the
tyranny of the many. It has been said that in a democracy, one depends on the wisdom of strangers. It is,
therefore, in our mutual interest to support the education, including higher education, of citizens in a democracy, since our fate depends on them. This was a new
and radical idea, because it rested on a new and radical
conception of citizenship.
How should we educate citizens for democracy? How
we answer this question depends, in part, on what we
think about democracy. Too often we identify democracy with such institutions as voting, representative

government, the rule of law, constitutional protections
of individual rights, and so forth. As important as these
are, democracy is more than this. John Dewey observed
that “a democracy is more than a form of government;
it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint
communicated experience” in which we understand our
own actions and interests in relation to shared concerns
of other citizens.2 At its core, a democratic form of life is
grounded in respect for individuals and our recognition
of an obligation to come together with other individuals
to make decisions about our common good.
This is more difficult than it sounds in a pluralist
society such as ours. We often bring very different
backgrounds and moral and religious perspectives to
many of the issues that we must decide as a people.
Think, for example, of the war in Iraq, of abortion
policy, or of support for embryonic stem cell research.
Our disagreement about the best policy is often based
on fundamental differences in basic moral and political
values—on different views about America’s role in the
world, for example, or the right to life vs. right to choice,
or when life begins. In a pluralist democracy, can anyone legitimately claim to be in possession of the truth
of the matter and declare that opposing views are false?
Plato wanted a philosopher king—someone who had
ultimate wisdom—to rule. But in a democracy, the
people rule (which is why Plato disliked democracy).
And in a pluralistic democracy, the people often disagree about fundamental values, yet we still must make
decisions that bind us all.
Political philosopher Benjamin Barber once observed
that “democracy begins where certainty ends.” 3 For
him, the political world is necessarily uncertain; a world
in which reasonable people can come to very different
conclusions, a world in which we must recognize that
other citizens have different values and also recognize
the fallibility of our own best judgments. How should
citizens and future citizens be educated for the challenges of a pluralistic democracy?

*This essay is adapted from chapter 6 of my book, Doubt and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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To frame this question, let me note a paradox about
the condition of democracy in the late 20th and
early 21st century. When Amartya Sen, the Nobel
Prizing-winning economist was asked what he thought
the most important development of the 20th century
was, he responded, “the emergence of democracy as
the preeminently acceptable form of governance.” 4 His
view is widely shared. Yet many students of American
culture believe that the idea of democracy at home is
deeply strained. In her book, Democracy on Trial, for
example, Jean Elshtain argues that democracy is in a
particularly perilous condition in our country. Elshtain
chronicles the ways in which we find ourselves being
pulled between an increasingly fragmented society
along the lines of race, ethnicity, and gender, on the one
hand, and the desire to see ourselves a one people, on
the other.
Elshtain begins her account of democracy’s perils
with the ironic observation of John Courtney Murray
that “disagreement is a very difficult thing to reach.” 5
She believes that it is the task of a democratic citizen in
a pluralist society to be able to reach disagreement, and
she uses the task of reaching disagreement as a lever
for diagnosing the fragile condition of democracy. She
believes we need a new social covenant in America. A
“new social covenant,” she writes, “is not a dream of
unanimity or harmony, but the name given to the hope
that we can draw on what we hold in common even as
we disagree.” 6
This, it seems to me, is the best formulation of the
challenge we face in thinking about education suited for
a pluralistic democracy. How are we to educate citizens
and foster institutions that allow us to differ in ways appropriate to a pluralistic society, yet find the common
ground necessary for social commitments and collective
responsibilities? Sen’s optimism about the spread of democracy and Elshtain’s distress about its fragility in our
pluralistic culture provide a powerful framework for
situating the cultural context of thinking about democratic education. This paradox offers the possibility to
foster an understanding of the hopes and risks of pluralistic democracy and, at a minimum, to give occasions
such as this dialogue series to reflect on the connection
between democracy and education.
The requirements of a pluralistic society have motivated a good deal of recent rethinking of the curriculum, most obvious in our attempts to deal directly with
issues of race, ethnicity, and gender in the curriculum,
and in requiring that students be introduced to nonWestern cultural perspectives. These are central to the
general education requirements for students at UNH

and most universities. But there are other, less obvious
areas of the curriculum that also need to be rethought
from the needs of democratic society. Think for a moment about why we require science of all students. Why
do we believe that it is important for students to study
biology, for example? Not why biology students or premed students should study biology, but why all students
study biology? That it is intrinsically important—true as
that might be—is not a sufficiently compelling answer.
There are lots of things that are intrinsically interesting
and important that we do not require of all students.
That knowledge of biology is important in a society
faced with significant policy decisions concerning
the environment, for example, or stem cell research is
compelling. Knowledge of biology or chemistry or an
understanding of technology and its social implications
is critical for informed citizenship. It is important for
democratic participation in policy decisions that are
consequential to us as members of society. If we believe
that informed citizenship is the reason that knowledge
of the sciences is important for all students, that is, if
scientific literacy is critical for the deliberative processes
of a democratic society, then this is the objective that
should guide the science we require of all students. The
democratic purposes of scientific understanding must
influence how the sciences are taught as part of the general education of all students.
Another less obvious but equally important democratic purpose of the education we expect for all students has to do with communication. Everyone believes
that a fundamental goal of the education of all students
is effective communication. Some of the most impressive recent work on curriculum and on teaching has
focused on the connection between writing and learning. But writing, and communication generally, should
not be thought of as merely modes of individual self-expression. Communication, of course, is fundamentally
dialogical—we are seeking to be understood by others.
But what might this mean in the context of democratic
education? What might teaching look like if it fostered
the dialogical aspects of communication in a pluralist
society?
In his essay, “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation
of Mankind,” Michael Oakeshott writes that “education,
properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and
partnership of…conversation, to recognize the voices,
to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and
in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits
appropriate to conversation.” 7 “Conversation” is a term
of art for Oakeshott. Its contrast concept for Oakeshott
is “inquiry.” The goal of inquiry is agreement about the
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truth of the matter, and while this is the appropriate
mode for many aspects of our life, it is unsuited to some
of our most fundamental disagreements. Conversation,
by contrast, is a partnership where the goal is less a
matter of agreement than of understanding those who
might differ. In a pluralistic society, we must recognize
that there will sometimes be reasoned disagreement
about some things—that sincere, intelligent, morally
sensitive people can think from or arrive at different
and incompatible values. In a pluralistic democracy,
thoughtful disagreement should be expected and
respected.
But still, in a democracy citizens must decide our
collective good even when we disagree. This is why
Elshtain thinks a pluralistic democracy requires a new
social covenant through which we can reach disagreement about some things yet still seek democratic agreement where we must.
Reaching disagreement is a skill that is in exceedingly
short supply. What we increasingly lack as a society is
the capacity for a conversation of diverse voices. This is
what I believe Elshtain means by a new social covenant.
It is what Amy Gutmann, a political philosopher and
president of the University of Pennsylvania, describes
as the very nature of democratic education. According
to Gutmann “the most distinctive feature of a democratic theory of education is that it makes a democratic
virtue out of our inevitable disagreement…?” That is,
democratic education is not about getting to the truth.
It is about the processes that cultivate the democratic
dispositions of citizens and the institutions that foster
those dispositions in the face of persistent differences.
As Alan Keenan has put it, it requires “affirming rather
than denying democracy’s constitutive incompleteness,
such a mode of democracy would require attitudes of
forbearance, self-limitation, and openness to collective
self-questioning.” 8
Here are some of my thoughts about ingredients of a
democratic disposition. First—and less obvious than it
may appear—it needs to be a disposition for democracy,
for its aspirations, their incomplete realization, and its
fragile nature. Second, it needs to include the capacity
for democratic communication. Mutuality and respect
for those who disagree are the conditions for the possibility of democratic communication. This is much more
than expressing and respecting diversity. It is the willingness to understand those who differ while seeking
common ground, given the persistence of differences.
Third, it needs to include the capacity to hold strong
convictions while recognizing one’s own fallibility and,
thus, the fallibility of one’s convictions. The ideologues

have framed too many of our important debates as if
our alternatives were true believers or the misguided,
between “red-staters” or “blue-staters,” patriots or
traitors, and so forth. What this divisive political landscape has produced is a great many people who have
become cynical about politics, alienated from governmental institutions, and indifferent about the outcome
of our crucial disagreements. It seems to me that the
democratic disposition must find its place between the
true believers and the cynics, since cynical indifference
is as much the enemy of democracy as intolerance.
Finally, a democratic disposition needs to be skeptical—not its cynical version, the version fostered by
world-weary editorialists and investigative reporters,
nor an indifferent skepticism which doubts equally every opinion. I mean the kind of skepticism exemplified
by Socrates who could conceive of himself both as son
of Athens, its true citizen, and yet its sharpest critic.
We need to commit ourselves to the democratic values
at the core of American society while being willing to
doubt and criticize presidents and congresses and nongovernmental institutions when they put those values
at risk. The historian, Daniel Boorstin, observed that
“the courage to doubt, on which American pluralism,
federalism, and religious liberty are founded, is a special
brand of courage, a more selfless brand of courage than
the courage of orthodoxy: a brand that has been rarer
and more precious in the history of the West then
courage of the crusader.” 9 Democratic education should
foster the courage to doubt.
What do you think about my suggestions and how
would you subtract or add to this list? Entering into a
conversation about what democracy is, about the relationship between education and democracy, and about
how we might educate citizens for a pluralist and democratic society is itself an aspect of democratic education,
since it recognizes that ultimately WE should decide
the answers to these questions. And the answers we
decide should be subject to the ongoing questioning by
future citizens. This conversation itself might serve to
invigorate your education and also to reinvigorate our
democracy.
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